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Abstract 
 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technology is considered by many 
an essential route to meet our climate mitigation targets in the power and 
industrial sectors. Deploying CCS technologies globally will first require a 
portfolio of large-scale demonstration projects. These first projects should 
help in learning by diversity, learning by replication, de-risking the 
technologies, and developing viable business models.  From 2005 to 2009, 
optimism over the pace of CCS rollout led to mutually independent efforts in 
the European Union, North America and Australia to assemble portfolios of 
projects. Since 2009, only a few of these many project proposals remain 
viable, yet the initial rationales for demonstration have not been revisited in 
the face of changing circumstances. Here we argue that learning is now both 
more difficult and more important given the slow pace of deployment.  
Developing a more coordinated global portfolio will facilitate learning across 
projects and may decide whether CCS ever emerges from the demonstration 
phase. 
 
Introduction 
 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies are still at the pilot 
and demonstration phase, even though economic models deem rapid wide-
scale deployment of CCS in the next few years to be essential in restraining 
the costs of meeting the 2°C target for global temperatures. [1,2] 
Paradoxically, it is primarily the costs of the early demonstration projects that 
have hampered further deployment.  Since each CCS ‘demonstration’ plant 
costs on the order of $1 billion, at a time of fiscal austerity it has proven 
difficult to justify public support.  Near-term pressure to develop CCS has also 
eased since most countries found it easier to meet their Kyoto targets 
because of the economic crisis (and other factors such as the U.S. shale gas 
revolution).  Meanwhile, unlocking private financing remains elusive and 
depends on developing necessary legal, institutional and commercial 
frameworks, as well as significant cost reductions and derisking that can only 
come from operating multiple plants. [3]  
 
Difficulties in justifying pilot and demonstration plants or deployment policy are 
hardly restricted to CCS, and can be found for nuclear power, renewables, 
and indeed virtually any novel technology [4-5], but the emphasis on 
demonstration is most common in the process industries. [6] At its broadest, 
CCS ‘demonstration’ has been identified as having a dozen or more 
manifestations, ranging from discourse creation to coalition formation. [7] We 
acknowledge the many important dimensions of demonstration, indeed, 
different disciplines have radically different conceptions of the nature of 
demonstration. [6] Given the overwhelming government and industry focus on 
cost reduction [8-9], however, we use this as a test of how learning is 
operationalised.  Governments should at least be able to construct a portfolio 
of projects along the dimension that they deem as central to the enterprise of 
demonstration.    
 
The technical rationales for demonstrations being large-scale include 
understanding power system reliability and performance [16] and adequately 
characterising each geological formation. [17] Since large-scale projects must 
store roughly 1 million tons of CO2 per year, [16-17] this scale requirement 
poses a number of challenges when seeking to learn from multiple projects  
 
In this Perspective, we explore the history of CCS demonstration in an effort 
to understand how the initial optimism about large-scale rollout led to multiple, 
uncoordinated efforts at learning from diversity.  In the absence of widespread 
deployment of CCS, the projects which have endured do not form a coherent 
program aimed at learning.  Going forward, therefore, any effort to 
successfully re-launch CCS at scale will need to revisit the fundamental case 
for demonstration, including how best to derive the most learning from the 
billions of dollars already invested and that will need to be invested in the next 
wave of projects.  There is a need for greater clarity over what time frame, at 
what scale, at what cost and to what end CCS demonstration is being 
pursued. [18] 
 
Great Expectations for CCS 
 
CCS technologies have long faced the challenge of wanting to be seen, on 
the one hand, as a novel technology that warrants public support and, on the 
other, as a well established set of technologies that should reassure investors 
(including governments) that the first plants can be viable at commercial scale 
(~300 MW).[10] In some respects, CCS as a suite of component technologies 
is indeed hardly novel.  Each element in the chain has a long history – 
Statoil’s Sleipner project has been storing a million tons of CO2 a year in the 
Utsira field under the North Sea since 1996 [11]; CO2 has been shipped 
hundreds of kilometres from natural sources in Colorado for use in enhanced 
oil recovery operations in West Texas for over thirty years [12]; and CO2 has 
been separated from natural gas and hydrogen since 1930 and hundreds of 
plants worldwide currently remove CO2 at a range of scales up to 40 MW. [13]  
 
The first large-scale CCS power project was proposed by BP at Peterhead in 
2002. [14] Yet, only in late 2014 did Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan become 
the first fully integrated CCS power project that incorporates capture, transport 
and storage. The owner of the 120 MW unit, SaskPower, has claimed that it 
would be able to reduce costs by 20-30% for the next unit at the same plant. 
[15]   
 
CCS first emerged on the international agenda at the Gleneagles G8 summit 
in Scotland in 2005, leading to a program of work for the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and to several countries seeking to rollout CCS technologies. In 
that same year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change produced a 
Special Report on CCS to review the state of knowledge. [16] During this 
period of optimism through to 2009, the European Union, Canada (or rather, 
Alberta), Australia and the United States each developed their own sets of 
criteria, which would guide the deployment of a portfolio of projects. The 
different nations’ proposals are summarised in Box 1.   
 
Box 1. National Ambitions for CCS 
 
Driven by aspiration for rapid wide-scale deployment, there was a competition 
in rhetorical ambition.  In March 2007, European leaders issued a declaration 
calling for ‘up to 12’ CCS demonstration power projects to be in operation by 
2015 and launched the EU Technology Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel 
Power Plants (ZEP).  This aim was amended to ’10-12’ projects by 2020 and 
envisioned 80-120 commercial CCS projects by 2030 in the EU alone. [19] 
 
In parallel, Norway also committed to taking the lead on CCS technology, and 
in 2006, Prime Minister Stoltenberg described CCS as their “moon landing” 
[20] with a pledge to capture 100,000 tons a year at the Mongstad refinery on 
a pilot basis and then scale that up to 2 million tons a year after five years.   
 
Other countries also signaled their ambitions.  The United States proposed 
the $1 billion Futuregen project in 2003, which would have been a 275 MW 
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant in Illinois, followed in 
2009 by stimulus spending pledges of over $3 billion on a range of projects.  
The Canadian government offered C$650 million for large-scale CCS 
projects, supplemented by C$1.3 billion from the Government of Alberta.  
Apart from project support, Australian Premier Rudd pledged A$100 million 
per annum over four years for a Global CCS Institute. In 2007, the British 
Government offered £1 billion in capital support (and the promise to cover 
higher operating expenditures) as part of a competition for a coal-fired post-
combustion project, which was to be followed by three further CCS plants. 
Other major countries actively investigating large-scale CCS projects (with 
differing degrees of state and private interest) included the Netherlands, 
Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy, and Romania as well as developing 
countries including China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and UAE.   
 
Although countries pledged significant sums at the time, there was an obvious 
disconnect between the envisioned role that CCS could play in keeping global 
temperature rise below 2 °C and the reality of government budgets and the 
legal, regulatory, commercial and technical challenges of deploying dozens or 
even hundreds of new billion-dollar power plants within a decade or two.  The 
ambitious IEA (2009) technology roadmap imagined 100 plants by 2020 and 
3000 by 2050 with required investments of $5 to $6 billion per year between 
2010 and 2020, with roughly two-thirds of the investment coming in developed 
countries. [21] Even in 2009, given the slow pace of developing large 
infrastructure in most advanced economies, the proximity of 2020 did not offer 
much opportunity for a rollout where there would be much learning from one 
project to the next.   
 
The key question is how best to learn. R&D on CCS is seen as having one of 
the highest median returns [22], which begs the question of why and when to 
demonstrate CCS options relative to continued R&D.  CCS faced unproven 
business models and skeptical investors, novel technology integration 
challenges and the need to deliver at a commercial scale while still at the 
demonstration phase. [23]    
 
 
Principles of Demonstration 
 
To establish a set of criteria, it is necessary to ask basic questions about the 
nature of any demonstration program.  Some of the many possible objectives 
cited include:  speed of deployment [24], value for money,  industrial policy, 
and  learning potential. As we shall see, each of the first three objectives can 
ultimately be understood in terms of learning potential (or uncertainty 
reduction). [6] 
 
Ultimately, given its higher costs, CCS will need a sustained high carbon price 
and/or a binding technology mandate, but first an effective demonstration is 
needed to convince investors (including governments) to support CCS in the 
near term and ahead of other competing technologies such as nuclear power 
or renewables with storage, Thus, the eventual speed of deployment will not 
depend on sheer number of projects but the success of learning at the 
demonstration phase.   
 
Providing cost competition will help improve the value proposition, but “value 
for money” is meaningless without a clear understanding of “value”.  Individual 
demonstration plants can be assessed in terms of carbon abated (or avoided) 
per unit cost, but if that was truly the objective, then many other technologies 
would offer both better value and greater certainty. At the demonstration stage 
at least, the chief value lies in either revealing technology performance 
relative to expectations or other technologies (learning from diversity) [25] or 
demonstrating potential cost reductions at later stages (learning from 
replication). [26] Thus, a technology shown to be capable of saving 30% for 
the next unit will be of superior value to one leading to minimal saving 
potential or significant cost overruns. [27]  
 
Much like basic R&D, demonstration requires tolerance of failure. [28] At the 
scales discussed (~300 MW or 1 million tons of CO2 stored), the stakes are 
high and costly early failures may reduce support for the technology.  
Governments or regulators will want to impose budgetary constraints or 
otherwise protect consumers from cost overruns, but the nature of 
demonstration implies the need to assume some risk by identifying innovative 
technologies that might have a higher potential for learning. [29] 
 
Finally, national priorities such as industrial policy or energy security are put 
forward as justifications for CCS. [30-31] Similar to both previous propositions 
though, CCS will only deliver large-scale industrial redevelopment or a 
significant share in the energy mix if it can demonstrate costs are reasonable 
and can be driven down further.  Lowering CCS costs is essential in trade-
exposed sectors such as steel, chemicals or cement where producers have a 
credible threat of shifting production abroad, unlike fixed assets such as 
power plants. [32]    
 
Given the focus on cost considerations, we largely neglect the important 
subject of social learning [18] and restrict our discussion of learning potential 
to:  learning from diversity, which seeks validation of the main available 
technological options; and learning from replication or learning-by-doing.  
There are important tradeoffs and complementarities between the two. 
Replication assumes a degree of clarity regarding where to place resources in 
the hope of driving down costs, whereas investments in diversity implies a 
spreading of bets in the hopes of resolving uncertainties [33]  
 
Replication has been (and is) particularly important for technologies such as 
solar photovoltaics or wind, which has seen costs fall dramatically as millions 
of kW-scale units have been produced. [34-35]  By contrast, CCS projects are 
‘lumpy’, insofar as each project is 100 MW scale and up and there is still the 
danger of technology lock-out or lock-in. [36-38] Learning may not be stable 
and may vary over time. [39-40] In the near-term therefore, priority should be 
on learning from diversity. But soon there will be a need to balance replication 
in the form of second- or third-of-a-kind demonstration, which will provide 
better assessment of cost reduction potential, against the benefits from 
investing in new technologies that may offer longer-term breakthroughs or 
benefits that may be cut off by a too-early focus on replication.  
 
Recognising the cost of even single plants, there have been calls for greater 
international coordination. de Coninck, Stephens and Metz [41] outline 
principles for a world-wide demonstration program including laudable goals 
such as global coordination to “enable a variety of CCS technologies to be 
demonstrated in various contexts and countries”; greater exchange of 
information; and more effective communication. But most challenging is the 
aim of cost-sharing to pool global demonstration funds. Independent national 
approaches inevitably produce inefficiency and barriers to learning, but the 
potential for a global cost-sharing mechanism is easier to imagine for “big 
science” projects such as ITER or LHC, rather than projects primarily 
developed by industry and aiming to be commercial within a decade. [42] 
Instead, a focus on fewer countries, nonbinding mechanisms, and greater use 
of review procedures can help facilitate more effective agreements. [43]   
 
 
 
Past Efforts to Develop Portfolios of CCS Projects  
 
Although learning about costs was incorporated into the portfolios of CCS 
projects, they also added other, less clearly defined objectives or priorities, in 
many cases seeming to create more of a wishlist that balanced out different 
constituencies rather than a clearly crafted set of principles that would 
produce a CCS rollout at least cost. Figure 1 presents a timeline of the most 
advanced demonstration projects, while Box 2 summarises the different 
national efforts.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here]   
 
Box 2. National CCS Programmes 
 
USA 
 
The U.S. designated $3.4 billion for CCS largely via economic stimulus 
spending: $1.5 billion for industrial CCS projects on a competitive basis, $800 
million for the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI), and $1 billion for 
FutureGen.  US GAO (2009) compared the original and restructured 
Futuregen projects in the US and suggested more attention instead be paid to 
the competitive process adopted by CCPI to demonstrate advanced coal- 
based power generation technology in multiple projects at commercial scale. 
[44] CCPI selection criteria included: a minimum scale (0.3 Mt per year) and 
capture efficiency; demonstrating significant progress with “less than 10 % 
increase in electricity costs”; using domestic coal; and that the private sector 
provide at least half the funding.   
 
Australia 
 
In Australia, the government pledged A$2 bn (US$1.65 bn) for demonstration 
projects. The Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund (LETDF) was a 
A$500 million support scheme that sought to fund CCS demonstrations plus 
other novel forms of low-carbon energy. In its first round, LETDF sought to 
support four fossil fuel projects (3 coal and 1 natural gas) as well as a large-
scale solar concentrator.  LETDF applied five “merit” criteria: potential to 
reduce emissions over the longer term; support Government’s policy and 
program initiatives; leverage greater non-Australian-Government investment; 
demonstrate value for money; and address any significant barriers or risks for 
the project. 
 
Alberta 
In 2008, Alberta undertook a similar exercise and initially sought 3-5 operating 
projects at a cost of C$2 billion.  The Government of Alberta wanted a total 
portfolio that added up to 5 MtCO2 per year by 2015, including a minimum 
project threshold of 500,000 tCO2 per year.  Each project was to be fully 
integrated and at least one would store >1 MTCO2/year.  In terms of capture 
and storage options, at least one would provide direct storage (e.g., in a deep 
saline formation) rather than enhanced oil recovery (EOR), at least one retrofit 
and one new build, at least one electric power application, at least one oilsand 
application and at least one ‘other’ application. 
 
European Union  
In October 2007, the EU ZEP technology platform described the manifold 
goals of the EU flagship program including overoptimistic objectives such as 
“demonstrate Europe’s leading edge technology and spur action by other 
countries” [19] (notably India, China and the U.S.), as well as objectives that 
relate back to our principles of demonstration listed abovein the main text, 
such as ensuring “a diverse geographical and technological spread of 
projects” [19] (learning from diversity) and accelerating cost discovery 
(learning from replication). Fourteen portfolio criteria were presented, which 
can be grouped by diversity in: (i) storage option: depleted oil and gas fields, 
deep saline aquifers, onshore and offshore; (ii) capture technology: pre-
combustion, post-combustion and oxy-fuel; (iii) fuel: hard coal, lignite, gas, co-
fired biomass; (iv) transportation mode: ship, cross-border pipeline; and (v) 
new build and retrofit. 
The portfolio was also meant to include a project in an emerging economy 
and at least one non-power project, all of which would test efficiency, 
geography and commercial structures.  Some of these criteria, notably, 
learning from diversity in capture technology, are critical to the fate of CCS, 
but others simply reflect a subset of the many possible permutations in 
developing CCS projects and would not, in themselves, significantly contribute 
to cost reductions or derisking. 
Following initial support of €1.05 bn for six projects via stimulus spending in 
2009, support was to be operationalised through the NER300 program, which 
would auction 300 million emissions allowances (EUAs) set aside as part of 
the New Entrant Reserve (NER). At the time of its launch, EUA prices 
hovered around €15 per ton of CO2, which would have implied almost €5 
billion in funds available, primarily for CCS.  Launched in November 2010, the 
European program was expected to co-fund eight CCS projects: 1-3 for each 
capture technology, at least 3 in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, and at least 3 
in saline formations.   
 
What is striking about each set of criteria is, on the one hand, their ambition 
and comprehensiveness, and on the other, their independent formulation and 
seeming lack of coordination in development.  Even if all projects had been 
successful, more coordination would have been warranted to improve the 
likelihood of genuine learning from diversity and to help reassure investors 
regarding technology cost.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 around here]   
 
Reflecting the ambition of the time, in Figure 2, Gibbins and Chalmers (2008) 
[24] describe a vision where there would be a ‘first tranche’ of demonstrations 
through 2015, a ‘second tranche’ driven by commercial and regulatory drivers 
from 2015 to the early-2020s and a global CCS rollout beginning in 2025. 
Updating this vision, we have added a rough schematic of what the actual 
deployment of CCS projects has looked like. The past decade has delivered a 
‘first tranche’ much smaller in scale and lasting much longer than originally 
anticipated.  Given a roughly ten-year lead time for any projects not currently 
in the pipeline, the real question post-2025 is how much the next generation 
of projects will benefit from learning and whether there is any realistic 
possibility of radical innovation and rapid diffusion. [46-47]    
 
The need for learning from diversity is acute.  As Rubin, Davison and Herzog 
(2015) conclude in a comprehensive study of the current status of CCS costs, 
although there have been some relative shifts between technologies, the 
“range of mitigation costs […] show considerable overlap” leading to the same 
conclusion as a decade earlier in the IPCC report over the inability to pick 
winners. [48]  
 
 
Post 2009 Progress and Roadmaps 
 
The 2009 IEA CCS roadmap [21] had highlighted the need to develop 100 
CCS projects over 2010-2020, storing around 300 MtCO2/year based on a 
global spend of $5-6billion/year, whereas by 2013, four operational projects 
and nine projects under construction were expected to store some 13 
MtCO2/year by 2016, with a spend of some $10billion between 2007 and 
2012.  Instead of 100 plants, the 2013 IEA roadmap called for “upwards of 30 
operating CCS plants” with a greater emphasis on the importance of 
developing countries and of industrial applications. [45] Still, given the 
proximity to 2020 and the current status of project funding around the world, 
that is an ambitious target. 
Many of the proposals shown in Figure 1 failed because of tepid or shifting 
government (and industry) support or because of genuine technical 
challenges and escalating costs encountered along the way, while other 
projects have soldiered on.  In Norway, the costs of Technology Centre 
Mongstad spiralled almost four-fold above initial estimates leading to an 
investigation by the Auditor General and the Norwegian government shutting 
down the project and withdrawing from plans to move beyond the pilot phase.   
 
In Alberta, Shell proceeded with a final investment decision on the Quest 
project in the oilsands on a zero net present value basis (a decision few other 
companies could or would be willing to carry on their balance sheet), and just 
began operations in late 2015. The Alberta Carbon Trunk Line project is to 
begin in 2016, operating at a small fraction of the pipeline’s capacity. [49] Other 
projects such as the Pioneer power project proved too costly to proceed.   
 
In Australia, the Zerogen project was cancelled by the Queensland 
government owing to cost concerns and lack of viable CO2 storage options, 
but the Gorgon project will capture 3.5-4 million tCO2 beginning in 2017 
(largely because CCS was included as part of the package to allow the 
lucrative LNG facility to be sited on Barrow Island rather than onshore). 
Moreover, the South West Hub project in Western Australia and CarbonNet 
network project in Victoria, both of which are ambitious pipeline projects, 
survived the climate-sceptical Abbott government, which was vocally hostile to 
CCS because they were able to sustain moderate levels of funding, but which 
have not yet proceeded to final investment decision.   
 
In the United States, Futuregen 2.0, beset by delays and an impending 
deadline to spend its stimulus funding, was cancelled in early 2015.  The 582 
MW IGCC plant at Kemper County in Mississippi is due to begin operations in 
2016 after delays of several years and costs spiralling to $5.6 billion, above 
the $2.4 billion cap imposed by the state utilities commission.  Once 
operational, it will be the largest power CCS project and the first to use IGCC.  
Other successful projects include two large industrial CCS projects at the 
ADM Decatur, Illinois ethanol facility and the Port Arthur refinery. 
 
The most dire record is perhaps in the European Union. Apart from the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2009 reducing EU emissions, making it easier to meet 
emissions targets and sapping government ambitions and finances, it was 
also directly tied to the EU’s main funding mechanism. Rather than raising the 
anticipated €5 billion to support CCS, the EUA price halved and the NER300 
yielded only €2.15 billion in funding.  Moreover, the scope was expanded to 
include ‘innovative renewable technologies” (IRTs) and €1 billion was raised 
in the first round in late 2012 for 24 IRTs in 16 member states, but not a single 
CCS project. [50] This CCS-renewable split reflects the breadth of support for 
renewables compared to CCS, which is only being pursued seriously in a 
small number of EU member states.    
 
Part of the reason for the lack of CCS projects was that the European 
Commission based its rank ordering of projects on volume of CO2 avoided, 
thereby favoring large coal projects. [51]  The Don Valley Power Project, a 
proposed 920 MW (gross) IGCC project, was ranked first overall by the 
European Commission but did not even make the top four projects in the UK’s 
own competition.  In the second round, €300m was ultimately allocated to the 
White Rose coal oxy-fuel project in the UK (along with an additional €1 bn for 
19 IRTs in 12 member states). 
 
The most advanced European projects are those participating in the UK 
Commercialisation Competition, which is still progressing with two plants, 
White Rose and a gas-fired post-combustion project at Peterhead.  An 
important learning benefit from these projects (as well as the two projects in 
the previous failed competition) is that the British Government paid £100 
million for detailed Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) studies, so these 
studies are now available to future developers.  A downside is that the UK 
Commercialisation Competition mandates that both plants operate in 
baseload, preventing learning about flexibility, which is one of the key 
rationales for considering CCS relative to other low-carbon technologies.  
 
As some European countries retrenched, there have been signs of a 
willingness to fund across borders.  For example, following German and 
Norwegian failures, both countries seem willing to fund the Dutch ROAD 
project, which remains the most advanced CCS project in continental Europe, 
but which had been stalled because of a funding shortfall. [52]  Although 
hardly a model for international cost-sharing, it is a first recognition of a need 
to move away from purely national approaches.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The exuberance of 2005-2009 has been replaced with obituaries of the 
technology [53-54], but neither extreme reflects the more nuanced current 
state of affairs. [55] Inevitably, CCS has been subject to a technology hype 
cycle. [28, 56] The expectations of the earlier period in part reflected a 
conflation of positive and normative assessments of technology rollouts, i.e., 
how many large scale CCS plants it would be technically, politically and 
commercially feasible to build versus how many plants would be needed if the 
world is to have a hope of remaining on a trajectory that would keep warming 
below 2 °C.  Informed by IEA and other analyses of the urgency of large-scale 
CCS deployment, many believed that single jurisdictions such as the EU or 
even Alberta could develop a sufficiently large portfolio of projects that 
concerns over wider coordination or thinking deeply over project timing, 
ordering and selection could be largely disregarded.   
 
As the pipeline of projects rapidly dissipated post-2009, it is perhaps 
understandable that there has been an overwhelming focus on delivering 
what was left rather than worry about coordination and learning since some 
projects were inevitably better than no projects. Still, for CCS to begin to play 
a larger role in reality rather than simply in the models of future deployment, it 
is imperative to finally begin to differentiate more and less costly technologies. 
There are, of course, many competing principles behind demonstration and 
cost differentiation is not in itself sufficient, but given the scarcity of projects 
and the overwhelming emphasis on costs by governments and industry, it is 
undoubtedly critical to whether CCS is to emerge from its own ‘valley of 
death’. 
 
The lack of CCS projects that has emerged may say more about the 
seriousness with which nations have addressed climate change than about 
CCS technologies per se.  Concerns over cost reduction dominate the 
industry and government views on how to proceed [9], but there has been 
precious little effort to revisit what constitutes an effective global portfolio in 
the face of greatly diminished individual national efforts. Rather than 
imagining some centrally conceived portfolio, there is a need for more 
negotiation across jurisdictions and accounting for what is going on elsewhere 
and learning from every stage of these other projects, both foreign and 
domestic.  
 
Having arrived at the current hodge-podge of projects by virtue of decisions 
made in 2005-2009 in a completely different political and economic context, 
there is now little guidance on what the next tranche of projects should seek 
to accomplish. For example, if the UK supports oxy-fired coal and post-
combustion projects, what rationale underlies the next UK investment? Is it 
simply to proceed with the next two plants on its 2010 shortlist or should the 
UK consider a second oxyfuel project or post-combustion gas plant (learning 
by replication) and/or reflect on what is needed globally and explicitly take into 
account projects in Canada, USA, Australia, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere 
(thereby strengthening international coordination)? Should greater emphasis 
be placed on learning about plant flexibility to improve our understanding 
about operations and help de-risk the technology? Should it seek to 
demonstrate bioenergy plus CCS or an industrial CCS hub (further 
broadening learning by diversity)?  
 
Striking the balance between learning from diversity and learning from 
replication will depend on finding ways to develop effective international 
coordination mechanisms and account for timing (and the inevitable delays 
and cancellations). There are no easy answers and the costs of each ‘bet’ are 
high, but there is an urgent need for opening a debate on the subject. 
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Figure 1. Timeline of Major CCS Demonstration Projects.  There have been projects which have captured, transported and/or 
stored CO2 for many decades, but we include here only integrated capture, transport and storage projects that were conceived as 
CCS projects.  We generally do not include the many projects that have been announced but which never received significant 
government and/or industry support.  Gas processing projects have largely been driven by regulatory requirements such as the 
carbon tax in Norway or being associated with profitable LNG enterprises as in Australia.  Industrial projects refer to projects in 
energy-intensive industrial sectors including steel, cement, fertiliser, and refineries.  For reference, we also include major reports 
and cross-national initiatives. Project data is largely drawn from the MIT CCS Project Database 
https://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects, supplemented by individual project websites and media reports. 
 
 
Figure 2. An updated model for CCS demonstration and deployment.  
The current rollout has fallen far short of aspirations. The dashed green and 
red curves anticipated two tranches of projects, leading to a rapid global 
rollout (solid purple line).  Instead, the solid green curve shows the very few 
plants that have come into service to date or that are in the pipeline. If costs 
remain high then several other demonstration plants will be built, but there will 
be no large-scale rollout (dashed blue line).  If learning of 20-30%, such as 
that claimed for Boundary Dam, can be extended, then there is a chance that, 
with a lag, there will be a global rollout as envisioned in IEA (2013) [45] but 
following a more traditional logistic technology deployment curve (dashed 
purple line).  Adapted with permission from Gibbins and Chalmers (2008)ref. 
[24], Copyright (2008), with permission from Elsevier. 
 
 
